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managerialism in legal proceedings,23 but we could explore more principled reasons
for reform based on the lessons of psychology. For instance, would it be better to gain
evidence from witnesses as soon as possible before memory fades and/or is altered by
external and internal influences? Should we allow both trial and appeal courts to read
and reread transcripts in an atmosphere unaffected by the drama and tensions of the
courtroom and the pressure to make instant and final decisions? Whatever the merits
of various suggestions for reform, the issue of witness demeanour illustrates a more
general problem with much of Anglo-American legal procedure and evidence law,
namely their basis in “armchair psychology”24 or “fireside inductions”25 about how
the human mind works.26 It seems appropriate to conclude that, if we are serious
about ensuring a fact-finding system which maximises its ability to ascertain accurate
facts, we need to pay more heed to the results of those who study human behaviour
using accepted research methods.
Donald Nicolson
University of Strathclyde
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The Mutuality of Obligations Doctrine and
Termination of the Employment Contract: McNeill v
Aberdeen City Council (No 2)
The decision of the Inner House in McNeill v Aberdeen City Council (No 2)1
underscores the extent to which the doctrine of mutuality of contractual obligations
in Scots contract law occupies vital territory in the Scots common law regulating
the termination of the contract of employment. As such it has implications both for
contract law and for the shape of employment law in Scotland, particularly in relation
to an employee’s statutory right to terminate the employment contract and claim
compensation from the employer pursuant to the statutory concept of constructive
dismissal in section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”). It provides
an additional example of a divergence of approach between the common law of the
23 See J McEwan, “From adversarialism to managerialism: criminal justice in transition” (2011) 31 Legal
Studies 519.
24 D Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (1988) 69.
25 P E Meehl, “Law and the fireside inductions: some reflections of a clinical psychologist” (1971) 27 J of
Social Issues 65.
26 See the series of early studies by Hutchins and Slesinger, discussed in D Carson, “Psychology and law:
a subdiscipline, an interdisciplinary collaboration or a project” in Bull and Carson (n 17).
1 [2013] CSIH 102, [2014] IRLR 113.
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contract of employment in Scots and English law.2 In this article the relationship
between the mutuality of obligations doctrine in Scots law and the content of the
implied terms of the contract of employment is examined, as are the implications of
the decision for statutory constructive dismissal claims.
A. THE FACTS AND THE DECISION
A claim for constructive dismissal under section 95(1)(c) of the ERA entails the
application of a curious amalgam of traditional common law doctrine and self-
contained statutory techniques. This statutory provision directs that an employee is
constructively dismissed by his employer if the employee terminates the employment
contract (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate
it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. Pursuant to the decision of
the Court of Appeal in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp,3 if an employee is
able to show that the employer’s conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach going
to the root of the contract of employment this will be sufficient for the employee
to establish constructive dismissal under section 95(1)(c). As such, the statutory
constructive dismissal concept was hung on the coat-tails of orthodox common law
principles under the law of contract. Subsequent to Western Excavating, it was held
that a fundamental breach of an express term, or a common law implied term, of
the contract of employment by the employer would be considered sufficiently serious
to entitle the employee to a finding of constructive dismissal.4 Since the authorities
demonstrate that a breach of the common law implied term of mutual trust and
confidence (“ITMT&C”) is automatically repudiatory,5 the effect is that a breach by
the employer will amount to a statutory constructive dismissal.6
InMcNeill the employee claimed that he had been constructively dismissed under
section 95(1)(c) on the ground that his employer had committed a repudiatory
2 In English law, an employer is prevented from curing a repudiatory breach of the contract of
employment, whereas this is possible in Scots law: cf Buckland v Bournemouth University Higher
Education Corp [2011] QB 323 at 333H-336E with the Scottish decisions in Barclay v Anderson
Foundry Co (1856) 18 D 1190, Lindley Catering Investments Ltd v Hibernian Football Club Ltd 1975
SLT (Notes) 56, Strathclyde R C v Border Engineering Contractors Ltd 1998 SLT 175, Morrison and
Mason v Clarkson Bros (1898) 25 R 427, 5 SLT 277, Millars of Falkirk Ltd v Turpie 1976 SLT (Notes)
66 and Magnet Ltd v John Cape t/a Briggate Investments, Sheriff Evans, Cupar Sheriff Court, 19 July
2007. Moreover, in Scots law the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies to exclusion and limitation
of liability clauses in employment contracts (Chapman v Aberdeen Construction Group plc 1993 SLT
1205), whereas this is not the case in English law by virtue of the decision of Lord Justice Mummery in
Keen v Commerzbank AG [2007] ICR 623. These are just some examples of a divergence of approach.
3 [1978] QB 761.
4 M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (2003) 155-156; L Barmes, “Common law implied
terms and behavioural standards at work” (2007) 36 Industrial LJ 35 at 37-38.
5 Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84 at 86 per Arnold J; Woods v W M Car
Services [1981] ICR 666 at 672 per Browne-Wilkinson J;Morrow v Safeway’s Stores [2002] IRLR 9; and
Amnesty International v Ahmed [2009] IRLR 884 at para 70.
6 Eastwood v Magnox Electric plc (and McCabe v Cornwall County Council) [2004] IRLR 733 at paras
4-7 per Lord Nicholls); Freedland, Employment Contract 155-156; Barmes (n 4) at 37-38; B Hepple,
Rights at Work: Global, European and British Perspectives (2005) 52.
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breach of the ITMT&C of the employment contract. However, the employee was
himself in anterior repudiatory breach, having breached the ITMT&C prior to
his employer’s repudiatory breach. When the employee’s conduct breached the
employment contract the employer failed to accept the employee’s breach and
terminate the employment contract. Hence, the employee’s own repudiatory breach
of contract was still in play when he claimed constructive dismissal. The central issue
in McNeill7 was whether the employee’s failure to come to the court with “clean
hands” prevented him from founding on his employer’s subsequent repudiatory
breach by virtue of the doctrine of mutuality of contractual obligations.
In the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”)8 Lady Smith held that the employee
could not establish a statutory constructive dismissal under section 95(1)(c) and
that he could not terminate the employment contract. Since he was in anterior
repudiatory breach of contract Lady Smith invoked the doctrine of mutuality of
contractual obligations in order to prevent him from (i) demanding performance
from the employer and (ii) accepting its subsequent repudiatory breach as bringing
the contract to an end. The mutuality doctrine was articulated by Stair9 as meaning
that in mutual contracts “neither party should obtain implement of the obligements
to him, till he fulfil the obligements by him”. However, in the Inner House, Lord
Drummond Young allowed the appeal from the decision of the EAT on the basis
that the mutuality doctrine had no application to the case. The point was made that
the employee was not seeking to implement or enforce the terms of his employment
contract by terminating it and claiming constructive dismissal on the grounds of
the employer’s repudiatory breach of the ITMT&C, since he was not seeking to
compel the employer to perform the “substantive obligations” of the contract.10
The “substantive obligations” were described as the employer’s obligation to provide
a reasonable or minimum amount of work and to pay for it and the employee’s
corresponding obligation to perform the work when furnished by the employer, i.e.
the “work-wage” bargain.11 Lord Drummond Young was of the view that the EAT had
adopted the doctrine of mutuality of obligation in a novel albeit wholly unwarranted
way to rule that where there are two guilty parties in a contract the party who was first
at fault cannot accept the faulty performance of the other’s counterpart obligation
so as to bring the contract to an end. This conflicted with the standard operation
of the doctrine, whereby “a guilty party is prevented from demanding [implement,
7 Other legal points were addressed but this note is restricted to considering the mutuality issue. For
example, it was held that the rules relating to the statutory concept of constructive dismissal under
section 95(1)(c) should be governed by the proper law of the employment contract rather than English
contract law at the time of the decision in Western Excavating, see McNeill at 117-118 per Lord
Drummond Young (with Lord McGhie dissenting at 129-130).
8 Aberdeen City Council v McNeill [2010] IRLR 374.
9 Inst 1.10.17.
10 Lord Drummond Young’s formulation in McNeill means that Lord Jauncey’s obiter dictum in Bank of
East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 at 1216L that he “did not consider that . . . any
material breach by one party to a contract necessarily disentitles him from enforcing any and every
obligation due by the other party” ought to be treated with some caution.
11 McNeill at 121.
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enforcement, performance or] fulfilment of the obligations in which he is a creditor,
unless he has performed, or is prepared to perform, the obligations which he is
himself undertaking and in which he is a debtor”.12 Lords Eassie and McGhie agreed
with this analysis.13
B. THE MUTUALITY DOCTRINE
In Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd14 Lord Hope endorsed Lord
Drummond Young’s description of the doctrine of mutuality in Hoult v Turpie,15
namely that it has “generally been given a wide scope in Scots law, [being] . . . derived
from the exceptio non adimpleti contractus”16 defence. The doctrine affords two
principal remedies to an innocent party where the counterparty is in repudiatory
breach of contract, namely rescission and retention. In McNeill, the employer
had neither responded to the employee’s repudiatory breach by accepting it and
terminating/rescinding the employment contract, nor had the employer sought to
retain any of the substantive obligations of the contract, i.e. its obligation to furnish a
reasonable or minimum amount of work and pay for it, by suspending the employee in
response to his repudiatory breach. Instead the employer had purported to withhold
its obligation to preserve trust and confidence under the ITMT&C in a manner
which purported to deny the employee in anterior repudiatory breach the right
to bring the contract to an end. Lord Drummond Young took the view that (i)
the remedy of rescission was of no relevance in the case and (ii) the doctrine of
retention did not apply17 since the employer could not temporarily withhold/retain its
own performance of the ITMT&C, which could not be categorised as a substantive
obligation:18
[whilst the ITMT&C] affects the way that the parties act in performing their substantive
duties . . . it is conceptually distinct [and therefore] . . . if there is a sufficiently material
breach of contract by the employee, the employer will be justified in suspending
employment and not paying salary or wages, but will not be justified in going further and
performing acts that are calculated to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of mutual
trust and confidence.
The justification for holding that the ITMT&C was not a substantive obligation was
two-fold. First, this proposition was motivated by the concern that to find otherwise
would enable the employer to take any prior repudiatory breach by the employee and
use it as a means of treating the employee in a “wholly outrageous manner, without
12 Forster v Ferguson & Forster, Macfie & Alexander 2010 SLT 867 at 874-875 per Lord Clarke.
13 McNeill at 114 and 129.
14 [2010] UKSC 19, 2010 SC (UKSC) 106.
15 2004 SLT 308.
16 Inveresk at 122 per Lord Hope.
17 Although the employer had failed to accept the employee’s breach and rescind, and it could not retain
performance of its obligations under the ITMT&C, it was not left without a remedy since it still retained
the right to raise proceedings against the employee to claim damages for breach of contract.
18 McNeill at 121.
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any redress” which would “promote unfairness”.19 From the perspective of worker
protection, which the statutory regime of unfair dismissal was intended to achieve and
the significance of which was recently stressed by the Supreme Court,20 this aspect
of Lord Drummond Young’s judgment is to be commended. The second justification
was that it was of no relevance to the achievement of the objective of the remedy of
retention, namely to secure future contractual performance.21
It is the latter point, namely that the ITMT&C is not a substantive obligation,
that is controversial and arguably conceptually inapt, particularly insofar as it suggests
that the ITMT&C imposes somehow inferior obligations to those established by
the work-wage bargain.22 In light of the fact that the ITMT&C has been described
variously as (a) an “overarching obligation implied by law as an incident of the contract
of employment”;23 (b) assuming a “central position in the law of the contract of
employment”;24 (c) being “undoubtedly the most powerful engine of movement in
the modern law of employment contracts”;25 and (d) forming the “cornerstone of the
legal construction of the contract of employment”,26 this strand of Lord Drummond
Young’s reasoning is perhaps suspect. It is also controversial for another reason. For
example, consider the situation where an employee – such as McNeill – commits
a repudiatory breach of the ITMT&C. In this context, one must question whether
the position that the employer cannot retain performance of the same obligation is
plausible bearing in mind that reciprocity is the principal hallmark of the implied
term. In Inveresk both Lords Hope and Rodger ruled that the doctrine of retention
applied in respect of obligations which were the counterparts of each other, and that
where the obligation breached by the guilty contractor and the obligation withheld by
the innocent party arise under the same contract, it will be assumed that they are the
counterparts of each other.27 However, McNeill seems indirectly to reintroduce the
pre-Inveresk practice of forensically examining whether the obligations breached and
retained are indeed counterparts, notwithstanding that they were imposed under the
same contract. For example, in McNeill it was held that an employer cannot suspend
performance of its obligation to maintain trust and confidence in the teeth of a breach
of the employee’s obligations imposed by the ITMT&C. One wonders if there is not
so much distance between that position and saying that these obligations cannot be
19 McNeill at 121.
20 Gisda Cyf v Barratt [2010] UKSC 41, [2010] 4 All ER 851 at 863a per Lord Kerr.
21 McNeill at 120. As such, the underlying purpose of retention is to provide interim security to the
innocent party as a means of securing future contractual performance from the guilty counterparty.
22 However, it is consistent with the decision of the EAT in Standard Life Health Care Ltd v Gorman
[2010] IRLR 233 that there is no longer any obligation on the employer to provide work to the employee
where the latter is in repudiatory breach. This aspect of the decision inMcNeillmeans that the element
of the decision of the High Court in RDF Media Group Plc v Clements [2008] IRLR 207 which ruled
that the implied term could be retained does not form part of Scots law.
23 Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2003] 1 AC 518 at 536A per Lord Steyn.
24 D Brodie, “Mutual trust and the values of the employment contract” (2001) 30 Industrial LJ 84 at 86.
25 Freedland, Employment Contract 166.
26 H Collins, Employment Law, 2nd edn (2010) 106.
27 Inveresk at 124-125 per Lord Hope and 132-133 per Lord Rodger.
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equated as counterparts which would appear strained as the obligations derive from
the same reciprocal implied term.
The decision in McNeill raises additional issues. The first concerns the legal
position if the employer responds to the employee’s repudiatory breach of the
ITMT&C by withholding performance of the substantive obligation to provide work
to the employee and pay for it. The essence of the situation here is that the employer
suspends the employee. An important question is whether the employer would be
entitled to withhold payment on the basis that the employee is not working. Logically
one might argue that pay can be withheld relying on the brocard “no work, no pay”28
or, more evocatively, “the consideration for work is wages, and the consideration for
wages is work”.29 Indeed, Lord Drummond Young explicitly states that the employer
will be entitled to withhold wages when it suspends the employee.30 However, the
common law unequivocally says otherwise: the employee must continue to be paid
if he or she is ready and willing to work, albeit not actually working.31 This will
undoubtedly be the case when the employee is suspended. A second matter is
whether it is possible for the employer to maintain and preserve trust and confidence
whilst the work-wage bargain is effectively suspended. This is the effect of the notion
in McNeill that the substantive obligation of the employment contract enjoining the
employer to provide work is temporarily withheld, whilst the employer’s obligation
of trust and confidence under the ITMT&C continues. At the point of suspension,
it is not obvious that harmonious relations between the employer and employee can
be maintained to any meaningful and durable extent. The saliency of this point is
underscored by the number of cases in which it has been held that the employer’s
power of suspension was exercised in breach of the implied term.32
Notwithstanding these reservations about the decision in McNeill, Lord
Drummond Young’s position has the attraction of being consistent with the
Scottish Law Commission’s understanding of the legal position.33 Furthermore, it
is compatible with the elective theory of termination of the employment contract
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Société Générale (London Branch) v Geys.34 For
instance, where an employee such as McNeill is in anterior repudiatory breach of
contract he or she is not deprived of his or her right of election, i.e. whether to
accept the employer’s subsequent repudiatory breach of contract and “terminate” the
employment contract or alternatively to affirm the employment contract whereupon
28 Luke v Stoke-on-Trent City Council [2007] ICR 1678 at 1685E per Mummery LJ.
29 Browning v Crumlin Valley Collieries Ltd [1926] 1 KB 522 at 528 per Greer LJ.
30 McNeill at 121.
31 Cuckson v Stones (1858) 1 E & E 248; Miles v Wakefield [1987] AC 539 at 561A–B and 564G–565B
per Lord Templeman; Miller v Hamworthy Engineering Ltd [1986] IRLR 461; BT v Ticehurst [1992]
ICR 383; and Beveridge v KLM (UK) Ltd [2000] IRLR 765 at 766 per Johnston J.
32 See Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703; Milne v Link Asset & Security Co Ltd
[2005] All ER (D) 143 (Sep); TFS Derivatives Ltd v Morgan [2005] IRLR 246; and Crawford v Suffolk
Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2012] IRLR 402 at 409-410 per Elias LJ.
33 See “Report on Remedies for Breach of Contract” (Scot Law Com No 174) para 7.13, available at
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/reports/1990-1999/.
34 [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 1 AC 523.
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it continues. If the opposite conclusion had been reached in McNeill, this would
have precluded the employee from exercising his or her right of election in such a
manner.35 As such, the elective theory would have been reduced to an empty concept.
C. CONCLUSION
Unlike some other recent key decisions in the field of employment law,36 McNeill
is one where policy considerations were overlooked in favour of the application of
orthodox contractual principles. The assertion that the law of constructive dismissal
should be consistent in England and Scotland was rejected and the Scots law doctrine
of mutuality of contract was applied to enable an employee in repudiatory breach to
terminate the employment contract. As such, employment protection was enhanced.
Although the effect of the decision is that the legal position differs north and south
of the border this may be no bad thing, particularly in light of the ripples that an
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The Power to Increase Sentence Ex Proprio Motu
on Appeal
The recent case of Murray v HM Advocate1 is a rare example of the High Court
utilising its power to increase the sentence of an offender who challenges its
“excessiveness” on appeal.Murray has already attracted attention for the way in which
the High Court dealt with sentence discounting for guilty pleas,2 but the ability of
35 For a detailed explanation of this point, see D Cabrelli and R Zahn, “The elective and automatic
theories of termination in the common law of the contract of employment: conundrum resolved?”
(2013) 76 Modern LR 1106 at 1118.
36 See Johnson v Unisys Ltd. [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518, where principle gave way to policy.
Here, the ITMT&C was held to be of no application to an employee’s dismissal by the more pressing
policy-oriented factor that the common law should not be expanded in such a way as to outflank the
intention of Parliament in promulgating the statutory scheme for unfair dismissal. This was taken
further in Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2011] UKSC 58, [2012] 2
AC 22, where, in the teeth of the same policy consideration referred to in Johnson, one of the most
axiomatic doctrines of the liberal common law system was abandoned, namely that where express terms
are breached this should sound in an action for damages.
1 [2013] HCJAC 3.
2 See F Leverick, “The rise and fall of the sentence discount” 2013 SLT (News) 259.
